This paper examines the prices versus quantities issue, originally raised by Weitzman [8], in the context of carbon dioxide emissions and with a special focus on electricity generation. Within a simplified model of the electricity market, in which we explicitly allow for a monopolistic gas supplier, we employ a game-theoretic approach and ask, from a welfare perspective, for the superior regulatory regime in response to an expected exercise of market power. Our analysis studies the optimal regulation in each regime and shows that, in the presence of market power in the gas market, taxes rather than permits are the regulator's welfare-maximizing regime choice.
Introduction
A standard method to correct for an externality, as, for example, air pollution and climate change resulting from the burning of coal, is to impose a (linear) tax at the rate of marginal external damages on the use of the entity responsible for the externality. In an idealized deterministic environment with perfect information and no transaction costs, any outcome of a price regulation via (linear) taxes can also be achieved by a regulation based on quantities, e.g., via a cap-and-trade scheme. Under a cap-and-trade scheme, the regulator issues a fixed quantity of permits, each of which allows its holder to generate one predetermined unit of the externality, and allows to trade these allowances, resulting in a market price for permits. In particular, both taxes and the market mechanism for tradeable permits are economically efficient since they allow the externality to be reduced at least cost, i.e., where it is cheapest for the economy. 1 The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), introduced by the European Union in 2005 in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, is one example of a cap-and-trade scheme. Basically, by assigning emission rights and then allowing to trade these rights, the ETS is a restriction on the annual flow of carbon dioxide emissions, covering different industry sectors as, among others, electricity generation, the largest covered sector in terms of emissions. Alternatively, governments could establish a price for carbon by imposing a (linear) tax on emissions. In this paper we compare (linear) taxes and tradeable permits in the context of carbon dioxide emis-sions from electricity generation, although in a specific setting. 2 Weitzman [8] shows in a seminal paper that, in the presence of uncertainty or asymmetric information about abatement costs and/or environmental damages, a quantity control is preferable to a price control (a linear tax) if and only if the marginal benefit of abatement curve is steeper than the marginal cost of abatement curve and vice versa. 3 If in the context of climate change, as part of the related literature appears to suggest, marginal costs of abatement are steeper than marginal benefits from reducing a pollutant, then this would be an argument for the use of carbon taxes rather than permits. 4 In a recent article, Newbery [6] investigates the effect of the European ETS on market power in the gas market and provides another argument for taxes rather than permits. Building on the observation that there is "existing market power in the gas market", 5 he argues that "fixing the quantity rather than the price of carbon reduces the price elasticity of demand for gas appreciably, amplifying the market power of gas suppliers, and amplifying the impact of gas price increases on the electricity price." According to Newbery, "the amplification of market power works through the impact on the price of EU Emission Allowances, which, as gas prices rise and lead to [the more-carbon intensive fuel] coal substituting for [the less-carbon intensive fuel] gas, raise emissions and hence the price of EU Emission Allowances, which in turn favours gas, offsetting the normal market demand response to an increase in the price of gas." Similar to Newbery [6] , it is the aim of our paper to compare (linear) taxes and tradeable permits in the context of carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation, explicitly taking into account the effects of market power in the gas market. In contrast to Newbery, however, we employ a game-theoretic approach and study the optimal regulation in response to an expected exercise of market power: In each regime, taxes and permits, we search for that level of the regulatory device which is welfare-optimal given that the gas supplier in turn and from his perspective optimally responds in exercising market power, and compare the two in order to find the regulator's welfare-superior regime choice. In order to elicit the effects of market power in deviation from the tax level corresponding to the optimal quantity (which equates marginal benefits and marginal costs from abatement) results (in the quantity at which marginal costs equal the tax rate and thus) in a high deviation from the optimal quantity -specifying a quantity directly is the better alternative. On the other hand, if marginal benefits are approximately constant and marginal costs are steep, even a high deviation in the tax level will only result in a small deviation from the optimal quantity -using a tax and letting the originator(s) choose a quantity close to the optimal level is the better alternative. Note that many subsequent contributions have modified the assumptions in Weitzman's uncertainty analysis. One strand of literature, for example, discusses the prices versus quantities question in a dynamic context where environmental damages are caused by a pollution stock rather than being a (quadratic) function of the flow of pollution (cf., for example, Newell and Pizer [7] ).
the gas market, we deviate from Weitzman's analysis in that we presume perfect information (about abatement costs and environmental damages).
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces our simple model. Section 3 outlines the benchmark result obtained for the competitive scenario. Section 4 and 5 are devoted to the analysis of the monopolistic taxes and permits regime, respectively. Section 6 compares the two regimes. A mathematical presentation of all (intermediate) results and corresponding proofs can be found in Appendix B. Remarks and standard calculations are deferred to Appendix A and C, respectively.
Our Model
Our simplified model of the electricity market consists of an environmental regulator, a gas supplier, and electricity producers. Electricity consumers enter only through their demand E( · ), which is a function of electricity price ω ∈ R ++ , and is derived from their maximization of utility from electricity consumption U ( · ), a function of units E ∈ R + consumed, minus corresponding costs ω · E via U (E) = ω. 9
For the supply of electricity, each producer can make use of two independent technologies, one based on the input coal, the other based on the input gas. Electricity producer i's corresponding production function is denoted by
gas (G), where K ∈ R + and G ∈ R + denote the input units of coal and gas, respectively. An electricity producer is assumed to maximize profits by choosing the input quantities appropriately, taking as given gas price γ ∈ R ++ , coal price p K ∈ R ++ , the equilibrium price of electricity ω * , and, depending on the regime, either tax level ("carbon price") p ∈ R + or the equilibrium price of emission permits P * . Assuming that total emissions from the production of electricity by producer i can be expressed as a function e (i) ( · , · ) of the input units K i and G i used, electricity producer i's profit is given by Π (i) ( 
, where x either equals tax level p (in an emission taxes regime) or the price of permits P (in an emission permits regime). In an emission taxes regime, letting (K * i (ω, p), G * i (ω, p)) denote electricity producer i's profit-maximizing input combination as a function of electricity price ω and tax level p, the equilibrium price of electricity ω * equates demand and supply in the market for electricity and is thus determined by E(ω * ) = i F (i) (K * i (ω * , p), G * i (ω * , p)). In an emission permits regime, letting (K * i (ω, P ), G * i (ω, P )) denote electricity producer i's profit-maximizing input combination as a function of electricity price ω and permits price P , equilibrium prices ω * and P * are determined by E(ω * ) = i F (i) (K * i (ω * , P * ), G * i (ω * , P * )) and i e (i) (K * i (ω * , P * ), G * i (ω * , P * )) = a, where a ∈ R + denotes the level of emission allowances. In our analysis we abstract from the allocation process (which is presumed to be efficient) within the supply side of the electricity market, and assume that both production and emission functions are the same across (non-strategic and price-taking) producers. 10 This allows us to model the supply side of the electricity market by introducing one (representative) electricity producer, whose choice maximizes
Note that all functions are specified in more detail later in this section.
10 For literature on the theory of environmental regulation in imperfectly competitive markets, cf., for example, Mansur [4] . In particular, Mansur examines the welfare implications of prices versus quantities when firms have market power in selling a polluting good (esp. electricity) and the environmental regulator assumes a competitive product market. For a recent article which reviews the literature on market power in pollution permit markets, cf. Montero [3] .
in an emission permits regime, 11 and
in an emission taxes regime, taking as given the price of gas and coal, and the equilibrium price of electricity determined by
In our model, the gas supplier can supply gas at per-unit costs of ψ ∈ R ++ . Whereas coal price p K is assumed to be set on competitive markets, we consider two different scenarios with respect to the gas supplier's price choice: In the competitive scenario, gas price γ equals marginal/average cost ψ; in the monopolistic scenario, the gas supplier chooses γ ∈ [ψ, ∞) so as to maximize profits.
The regulator aims at maximizing welfare from electricity generation. If the coal suppliers generate zero economic profit, then a measure of welfare, excluding the gas supplier's profits, can be defined by the difference between the utility from electricity consumption and the sum of the factor costs of electricity production and the social costs of emissions:
where "marginal emission cost" q ∈ R ++ is a measure of the per-unit-of-emissions welfare. The regulator's choice is the regime and the level of the regulatory device, i.e., the tax or permits level. In summary, the sequence of actions in the monopolistic scenario is as illustrated in Figure  1 . Figure 1 Our analysis of the two regimes follows standard backward induction and concentrates on the following specifications. Electricity demand is assumed to be linear in price, i.e.,
for some constants β 0 , β 1 ∈ R ++ . The electricity producer's production function satisfies
And, emissions from the production of electricity depend on 11 Essentially, the price equilibrium in the market for permits reduces to a quantity constraint for the electricity producer. A positive equilibrium permits price corresponds to a binding quantity constraint. Cf. Appendix A.
the respective input used, and are linear in the respective units of electricity produced:
In other words, we assume that there exist two constantsδ K , δ G ∈ R ++ (representing coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions, respectively) such that e(K, G)
Our analysis concentrates on the interior input factor area of electricity production and abstracts from the possibility that electricity could in principle be produced by using either gas or coal but not both. Technically, we restrict the electricity producer's choice set to the open area (K, G) ∈ R 2 ++ and require each player's equilibrium strategy to specify an action only (more precisely: exactly) at those of her/his decision nodes where there exists at least one action that results (via sequential rationality) in a well-defined outcome of the game and at the same time maximizes the player's target (welfare or profit) over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome; each player's equilibrium strategy must specify such an action at each of these decision nodes. 12 In order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in each regime, 13 we assume that marginal emission cost q satisfies q <q :
where R and D are as defined below. Furthermore, we presume that coal-based per-unit-ofelectricity emissionsδ K are higher than gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissionsδ G . Since
, this is equivalent to the requirement that
The results of our analysis depend, in part, on whether this measure of the difference between coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions is (relatively) high or low, more precisely on whether
is lower or greater than (or equal to) zero. For notational convenience, we define (on γ ∈ R ++ )
and abbreviate R := R(ψ), Ψ := Ψ(ψ), and Φ := Φ(ψ).
12 In other words, we require the electricity producer's equilibrium strategy to specify an action only at those of his decision nodes where previous decisions (about the gas price and the tax or permits level) allow him to maximize profits by choosing an input factor combination which is strictly positive in each component. Correspondingly, we require the gas supplier's equilibrium strategy to specify a gas price choice only at those of his decision nodes where the tax or permits level allows him to maximize profits over all alternatives which allow the electricity producer to maximize his profits within (K, G) ∈ R 2 ++ . And, finally, the regulator's equilibrium (regime and tax or permits level) choice must maximize welfare over all alternatives that allow the gas supplier to maximize profits over all alternatives which allow the electricity producer to maximize his profits within (K, G) ∈ R 2 ++ . 13 Note that, in the following, the word 'equilibrium' often refers to the subgame starting after the regulator's regime choice.
14 Cf. Appendix B, Lemma 1c, part f) of both Lemma 2.1 and 2.2, and Lemma 3a and b.
Finally, note that, in principle, an emission permits level can be either binding or not. Whether or not a permits level will be binding, i.e., effectively restricting the electricity producer's choice, depends on both the regulator's preceding permits level choice and the gas supplier's price response. Given a specific permits level choice, it might well be in the gas supplier's interest to respond with a gas price resulting in a non-binding permits level. And, taking into account the gas supplier's strategic response to her policy choice, it is a priori not clear whether the regulator would prefer a binding to a non-binding permits level from a welfare perspective. Therefore, our analysis has to keep track of both cases. 15 Before we proceed, please remember that a mathematical derivation of all the following is provided in Appendix B.
Analysis of the Competitive Scenario
In the competitive scenario, gas price γ equals marginal/average cost ψ. Correspondingly, our four-stage game formally reduces to three non-trivial stages: First, the regulator chooses the regime and level of the regulatory device. Afterwards, the electricity producer's choice of the two input quantities determines the combination of coal-and gas-based production. In any equilibrium of the emission taxes regime, the electricity producer's profit maximization, taking as given gas price (γ =) ψ and coal price p K , together with market clearing in the market for electricity implies that factor inputs K and G equal
respectively. Given these levels of coal-and gas-based electricity production, welfare, as a function of tax level p, can be calculated as (a quadratic function of p)
It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing tax level choice is p * := q, i.e., the optimal tax level equals the marginal welfare costs of emissions, resulting in welfare level
Lemma 1 in Appendix B confirms that (K * (p * ), G * (p * ), p * ) is the unique equilibrium in the competitive scenario of the emission taxes regime. In the emission permits regime, equilibrium factor inputs depend upon whether or not the permits level is binding, i.e., upon whether or not the permits level effectively restricts the electricity producer's profit maximization, taking as given gas price ψ, coal price p K , and the market clearing price of electricity. In any equilibrium of the emission permits regime, factor inputs K and G equal
respectively, if the permits level is non-binding, and they equal
respectively, if the emission permits level is binding. In particular, an emission permits level is 15 In particular, as it turns out, the regulator's decision for or against a binding permits level depends on whether or not marginal emission cost q is greater or lower thanq (Q)
binding if and only if it is lower than e(K
In the latter case, welfare, as a function of permits level a, can be calculated as
It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, is a * C (q) := a 1 −
2Ψ
Φ q > 0, resulting in welfare level
If, on the other hand, the emission permits level is (chosen such that it is) non-binding, then the resulting welfare equals that of the taxes regime (i.e., W ψ (p)) for tax level p = 0, which is lower than W C B (q). In other words, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is
is the unique equilibrium in the competitive scenario of the emission permits regime, and one with a binding permits level.
Comparing the welfare levels of the two equilibria, we obtain the expected benchmark result.
Proposition 1
In the competitive scenario, where gas price γ equals the gas supplier's per-unit cost ψ, the gas supplier's profits are zero, and the regulator's optimal policy in each regime (tax level q in the taxes regime and permits level a * C in the permits regime) implies the same welfare level:
Lemma 3c in Appendix B). In particular, both taxes and permits can be part of an equilibrium of the three-stage game starting with the regulator's regime choice.
Analysis of the Emission Taxes Regime
In the monopolistic scenario of the emission taxes regime, in contrast to the competitive scenario, the gas supplier can optimally react in response to the regulator's tax level choice, given his perception about the electricity producer's corresponding choice of the two input quantities. In any equilibrium of the emission taxes regime, the electricity producer's profit maximization, taking as given gas price γ and coal price p K , together with market clearing in the market for electricity implies that factor inputs K and G equal (K * and G * as defined in Section 3, i.e.,)
respectively. Given these levels of coal-and gas-based electricity production, welfare, as a function of tax level p, can be calculated as
In particular, if gas price γ does not depend on tax level p, then welfare W γ (p) is maximized at p = q, independent of the specific γ. Since the gas supplier's profits, given by (γ − ψ) · G * (γ), are maximized at
which is independent of the regulator's tax level choice p, 16 the regulator's welfare-maximizing tax level choice is p * := q, i.e., the optimal tax level equals the marginal costs of emissions. 16 This independence of the optimal gas price from the regulator's tax level choice results, in particular, from the property that gas demand G * and thus the gas supplier's profit as a function of gas price γ and tax level p is separable in these two parameters, i.e., can be written as the product of two functions, one in γ, the other in p.
Note that two ingredients of our model are responsible for the regulator's welfare-maximizing tax level choice to equal marginal emission cost q in both the competitive and monopolistic scenario: First, the gas supplier's optimal price choice in the monopolistic scenario is independent of the regulator's tax level choice, as is ψ in the competitive scenario; and, second, welfare at a specific gas price is maximized by choosing the tax level equal to q, independent of the specific (value of the) gas price.
To illustrate the second property, consider welfare W γ (p) as composed of utility and costs. The sum of factor and emission costs, a quadratic function of tax level p, is decreasing in p (as G * , K * , and electricity demand E * = F (K * , G * ) are decreasing in p). For the same reason, also the utility from electricity consumption, which again is a quadratic function of tax level p, is decreasing in p. The optimal tax level maximizes the difference between the two, i.e., between utility and costs. In other words, at q the slopes of the two curves with respect to tax level p are the same:
utility from electricity consumption factor and emission costs Figure 2 Considering now the effect of a change in gas price γ, we observe the following. The slope of the utility curve with respect to tax level p and at each specific p is decreasing in the gas price:
The utility effect of an increase in gas price γ on the optimal tax level is negative. However, as outlined above, this effect is exactly neutralized by a corresponding change in (the slope of) factor and emission costs. Tax level q remains the point where the slopes of the two curves with respect to tax level p are the same.
If the regulator chooses tax level p * = q and the gas supplier gas price γ * , then welfare equals
The gas supplier's corresponding profits are
Lemma 1 in Appendix B confirms that (K * (γ * , p * ), G * (γ * , p * ), γ * , p * ) is the unique equilibrium in the monopolistic scenario of the emission taxes regime. Proposition 2 summarizes our results.
Proposition 2
In the monopolistic scenario of the emission taxes regime, the regulator's welfare-maximizing tax level choice equals marginal emission cost q as in the competitive scenario, resulting in welfare level W M (q) and profits Γ(q) for the gas supplier.
Analysis of the Emission Permits Regime
Our analysis of the emission permits regime depends upon whether measure Q of the difference between coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions is lower than, greater than, or equal to zero. The following three paragraphs are devoted to these three cases, respectively.
The Case of a High Difference in Per-Unit-of-Electricity Emissions
Suppose that Q < 0 and consider the monopolistic scenario. As already mentioned earlier, in the emission permits regime, equilibrium factor inputs depend upon whether or not the permits level is in fact binding, i.e., upon whether or not the permits level effectively restricts the electricity producer's profit maximization, taking as given gas price γ, coal price p K , and the market clearing price of electricity. In particular, in any equilibrium of the emission permits regime factor inputs K and G equal
respectively, if the emission permits level is non-binding, and they equal
respectively, if the emission permits level is binding.
In case of a binding permits level, the gas supplier's profits are given by (γ − ψ) · G * B (γ) and maximized at gas price
, curve C B ( · ) reflects the gas supplier's achievable profits in case of a binding permits level. It is a quadratic function of a, which obtains its minimum value 0 at some level a 6 > 0. In case of a non-binding permits level, the gas supplier's profits are given by (γ − ψ) · G * A (γ) and maximized at γ * A := γ * (cf. Section 4). Defining C A (a) := (γ * − ψ) · G * A (γ * ), curve C A ( · ) reflects the gas supplier's achievable profits in case of a non-binding permits level. It is a constant function of a, i.e., C A (a) has the same valueC A for every permits level a. Denoting the two intersections of C B ( · ) with C A ( · ) by a 3 < a 6 and a 7 > a 6 , Figure 3 illustrates the two curves. The precise "values" of variables a 0 to a 7 are provided in Appendix B. Figure 3 If going for the binding permits level alternative, the gas supplier maximizes his profit
e., subject to the permits level being binding. Note that the inequality constraint cannot be satisfied for non-negative gas prices if (and only if) permits level a is greater than or equal to some level a 5 ∈ (a 3 , a 6 ). In other words, going for the binding permits level alternative requires a < a 5 . Furthermore, the inequality constraint allows to choose γ * B if and only if permits level a is lower than some level a 4 ∈ (a 3 , a 5 ).
If going for the non-binding permits level alternative, the gas supplier maximizes his profit
e., subject to the permits level being non-binding. The latter inequality constraint allows to choose γ * A if and only if permits level a is greater than or equal to some level a 2 ∈ (0, a 3 ). Therefore, assuming that the gas supplier has a preference for a binding (in comparison to a non-binding) permits level (if indifferent with respect to profits), the gas supplier goes for the binding permits level alternative if and only if a ≤ a 3 . In other words, if a ≤ a 3 , then gas price γ equals γ * B and the permits level is binding. If a > a 3 , then gas price γ equals γ * A , and the permits level is non-binding. In the latter case, the gas supplier's profits are
and the resulting welfare level, which is independent of a and in the following referred to as W M A (q), equals that of the taxes regime (i.e., W γ * (p)) for tax level p = 0, and is thus lower than its counterpart W M (q) in the taxes regime (where tax level p equals p * = q > 0).
Having analyzed the gas supplier's decision, we continue with the regulator's choice of the optimal permits level. If the permits level is binding, then welfare, as a function of permits level a, can be calculated as
It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, iŝ
and, in particular, higher than his welfare-maximizing permits level choice a * C in the competitive scenario. We comment on the latter result at the end of this section. The value of emission cost q at which a * M (q) equals a 3 is positive and in the following referred to as q 3 . If the regulator chooses permits levelâ * M and the gas supplier gas price γ * B , and if marginal emission cost q is greater than or equal to q 3 (and thusâ * M = a * M ), then welfare equals
, and the gas supplier's profits are
If q < q 3 (and thusâ
is an upper boundary for the resulting welfare. Comparing this welfare level to the one resulting from a non-binding permits level, we obtain
Thus, the optimal binding emission permits levelâ * M is welfare-superior to any non-binding one (i.e., to any permits level above a 3 ) if and only if marginal emission cost q exceeds level q(Q) (> q 3 ): Only if marginal emission cost q is sufficiently high, then the advantages of restricting the electricity producer's emissions in a binding manner, namely lower emission costs, outweigh the corresponding changes in factor costs and electricity production (and thus in utility from electricity consumption).
is the unique equilibrium in the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime whenever Q < 0 and q >q(Q). 17 17 And, Lemma 4 confirms that there are parameter constellations allowing q to satisfyq(Q) < q <q.
Proposition 3.1 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Q < 0 and consider the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime. a) If marginal emission cost q is greater thanq(Q), then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , resulting in welfare level W M B (q) and profits Γ B (q) for the gas supplier. The regulator's permits level choice is binding and higher than his choice a * C in the competitive scenario. b) If q ≤q(Q), then achievable welfare equals W M A (q) (via choosing a non-binding permits level) and is below that of the taxes regime, W M (q). The difference in achievable welfare between the two regimes,
The gas supplier's profits are Γ A .
According to case a) of Proposition 3.1, the regulator's welfare-maximizing binding permits level choice is higher in the monopolistic than in the competitive scenario. In order to understand why this is the case, consider the different components of welfare, which is defined as the difference between utility from electricity consumption and factor plus emission costs. As we have seen, for (γ, a) equal to (ψ, a * C ) or (γ * B ,â * M ), factor inputs for coal and gas equal K * B (a, γ) and G * B (a, γ), respectively, and electricity demand equals
If in the monopolistic scenario the permits level were chosen to be a * C (<â * M ) instead ofâ * M , then the resulting factor inputs for coal and gas would equal
, respectively, and electricity demand would equal
. Therefore, by allowing the electricity producer more emissions in the monopolistic scenario (via choosingâ * M instead of a * C ), the regulator is responsible for higher emission costs (since permits levelâ * M is binding) and higher factor costs for
). However, the higher emission permits level implies, at the same time, a higher electricity demand and thus a higher utility from electricity consumption as well as lower factor costs for gas ( 
). As Proposition 3.1 states, this second effect overcompensates the higher costs with respect to emissions and coal.
The Case of a Low Difference in Per-Unit-of-Electricity Emissions
Suppose now that Q > 0, and note that equilibrium factor inputs (as functions of gas price γ and permits level a) do not change: Factor inputs (K, G) equal (K * A , G * A ) in the non-binding and (K * B , G * B ) in the binding case. The role of a higher/lower permits level a in gas demand G * B , however, reverses. In particular, curve C B ( · ), which reflects the gas supplier's achievable profits in case of a binding permits level, is now increasing in and positive on a ≥ 0, and also a 2 > a 4 > a 5 > 0. Figure 4 illustrates the two curves C B ( · ) and C A ( · ) in case of Q > 0.
The latter inequality constraint allows for a non-negative gas price γ if and only if a > a 5 . And, if a > a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to
, which allows to choose gas price γ * A if and only if permits level a is greater than or equal to a 2 (γ(a 2 ) = γ * A ), resulting in profitC A for the gas supplier. If a ∈ (a 5 , a 2 ), then the gas supplier's profit is maximized by choosingγ(a), and his corresponding profit isΓ A (a) :
is a concave quadratic function of a, which obtains its maximumC A at a 2 and equals C B (a 4 ) at a 4 .
If going for the binding permits level alternative, the gas supplier
e., subject to the permits level being binding. The inequality constraint allows for a non-negative gas price γ if and only if permits level a is lower than some level a 0 > a 2 . And, if a < a 0 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to γ <γ(a), which allows to choose gas price γ * B if and only if a is lower than a 4 (γ(a 4 ) = γ * B ), resulting in profit C B (a) for the gas supplier. If a ∈ [a 4 , a 0 ), then the gas supplier's achievable profit is lower than (γ(a) − ψ) · G * B (γ(a)), which equalsΓ A (a). SinceΓ A (a) is below C B (a) on a < a 4 and belowC A on a > a 2 , it follows that the gas supplier goes for the binding permits level alternative if and only if a < a 4 . In other words, if a < a 4 , then gas price γ equals γ * B and the permits level is binding. If a ∈ [a 4 , a 2 ] or a ≥ a 2 , then gas price γ equalsγ(a) or γ * A , respectively, and the permits level is non-binding. Having analyzed the gas supplier's decision, we continue with the regulator's choice of the optimal permits level. If the emission permits level is non-binding and a ≥ a 2 , then the gas supplier's profits are Γ A > 0 and the resulting welfare level, which is independent of a, equals that of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0 and thus W M A (q). In particular, it is lower than its counterpart W M (q) in the taxes regime (where tax level p equals p * = q > 0). If the emission permits level is non-binding and a ∈ [a 4 , a 2 ], then welfare, as a function of permits level a, can be calculated aŝ
It follows that, whenever β 0 f G p K − 2Qq < 0, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the non-binding permits level alternative, is a 4 . The resulting welfare level W M (a 4 ) is in the following denoted byŴ M A (q). If, on the other hand, q is lower than or equal to
, then any a ≥ a 2 or any a ≥ a 4 , respectively, maximizes welfare, resulting in welfare level W M A (q) (=Ŵ M (a 2 )). If the emission permits level is binding, then welfare, as a function of permits level a, equals W γ (a), and the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, is
resulting in welfare level W M B (q) and profits Γ B (q) for the gas supplier. Since Q > 0, now the regulator's permits level choice is lower than his choice a * C in the competitive scenario.
Comparing the different welfare levels, we obtainŴ M A (q) < W M B (q) and
Thus, if marginal emission cost q exceeds levelq(Q), then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , the emission permits level is binding, and the resulting welfare level equals W M B (q). If q <q(Q), which implies that q <
, then any permits level a ≥ a 2 maximizes welfare, is non-binding, and results in welfare level W M A (q). If q =q(Q), which also implies that q < β 0 f G p K 2Q , then welfare is maximized by choosing either a * M (resulting in a binding permits level) or any level a ≥ a 2 (resulting in a non-binding permits level), and the resulting welfare equals
is the unique equilibrium in the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime whenever Q > 0 and q >q(Q). 18 Proposition 3.2 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3.2
Suppose Q > 0 and consider the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime. a) If marginal emission cost q is greater thanq(Q), then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , resulting in welfare level W M B (q) and profits Γ B (q) for the gas supplier. The regulator's permits level choice is binding and lower than his choice a * C in the competitive scenario. b) If q ≤q(Q), then achievable welfare equals W M A (q) and is below that of the taxes regime, W M (q). The difference in achievable welfare between the two regimes,
The gas supplier's profits equal Γ A .
The Borderline Case (Q = 0)
Suppose that Q = 0, and note that equilibrium factor inputs (as functions of γ and a) again equal (K * A , G * A ) in the non-binding and (K * B , G * B ) in the binding case. Since Q = 0, gas demand G * B is now independent of the regulator's permits level choice, curve C B ( · ) is constant in a and equalsC A , and a 0 = a 1 = a 2 = a 4 = a 5 .
The inequality constraint allows for a non-negative gas price γ if and only if a < a 5 , and allows to choose gas price γ * B if and only if a < a 4 (= a 5 ), resulting in profitC A for the gas supplier. If going for the non-binding permits level alternative, the gas supplier
The latter inequality constraint is satisfied for all γ ≥ 0 if a ≥ a 5 , and allows for a positive gas price γ if and only if a ≥ a 5 . It follows that the gas supplier goes for the binding alternative (via choosing γ * B ) if a < a 5 , and for the non-binding alternative (via choosing γ * A ) if a ≥ a 5 . His profit is Γ A =C A in either case.
As before, if the emission permits level is non-binding, then the resulting welfare level equals that of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0 and thus W M A (q). If the permits level is binding, then welfare, as a function of permits level a, equals W γ (a), and the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding alternative, is a * M (q), resulting in welfare level W M B (q).
18 And, Lemma 4 confirms that there are parameter constellations allowing q to satisfyq(Q) < q <q.
Since Q = 0, a * M (q) equals his choice a * C in the competitive scenario, and
is the unique equilibrium in the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime if Q = 0.
Proposition 3.3
If, in the monopolistic scenario of the emission permits regime, Q = 0, then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , resulting in welfare level W M B (q) and profits Γ B (q) = Γ A for the gas supplier. The regulator's permits level choice is binding and equals his choice a * C in the competitive scenario.
Permits versus Taxes
From Proposition 3.1b and 3.2b we already know that in the monopolistic scenario taxes are welfare-superior whenever marginal emission cost q is sufficiently low: If q ≤q(Q) (which implies Q = 0), then any non-binding permits level choice provides for at least the same welfare as the optimal binding permits level, and for less welfare than the optimal tax level. The following result, Proposition 4, which is based on Lemma 3a in Appendix B, implies that taxes are welfare-maximizing for all q. In particular, Proposition 4 compares the resulting welfare in case of an optimal binding permits level (cf. Proposition 3.1a, 3.2a and 3.3) with the welfare level achievable in an emission taxes regime, and shows that the gas supplier's ability to optimally respond to the regulator's choice makes it impossible for a binding permits level to result in a higher welfare level than the regulator's optimal tax choice.
Proposition 4 (Welfare in the Monopolistic Scenario)
Suppose that, in the monopolistic scenario, marginal emission cost q is greater thanq(Q). Then the difference in welfare between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime and the unique (and binding permits level) equilibrium of the permits regime, namely
, is nonnegative; the difference is greater than zero if and only if Q = 0, it is increasing in marginal emission cost q if Q < 0 and decreasing in q if Q > 0.
Combining our findings from Proposition 3.1b and 3.2b for the case q ≤q(Q) and from Proposition 4 covering marginal emission costs greater thanq(Q), we obtain the following result.
is the unique equilibrium of the four-stage game starting with the regulator's regime choice. Only if Q = 0, then both
permits") constitute an equilibrium of the four-stage game starting with the regulator's regime choice.
In particular, if the difference between coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions is high such that Q < 0, then the difference in achievable welfare between the two regimes increases in the marginal welfare costs of emissions: Taxes are welfare-superior and the higher marginal emission cost q, the greater is this superiority. If the difference between coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions is low such that Q > 0, then taxes are welfare-superior and the difference in achievable welfare between the two regimes increases in low and decreases in high values of q. We close our analysis and comparison of the two regimes with an evaluation of the gas supplier's profits in Proposition 5, which is based on Lemma 3b in Appendix B. In particular, Proposition 5 compares the respective profits for the gas supplier outlined in Proposition 3.1 to 3.3 across all possible equilibria of the two regimes. The subsequent corollary highlights the main result.
Proposition 5 (The Gas Supplier's Profits in the Monopolistic Scenario) If, in the monopolistic scenario, q ≥q(Q), then the difference in the resulting gas supplier's profits between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime and the binding permits level equilibrium,
, is non-negative; it is greater than zero if and only if Q = 0. If q ≤q(Q) (which implies Q = 0), then the difference in the resulting gas supplier's profits between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime and any non-binding permits level equilibrium of the permits regime, namely Γ(q) − Γ A , is greater than zero.
Corollary In the monopolistic scenario, whenever Q = 0, then the gas supplier's profits in the unique equilibrium of the emission taxes regime are higher than his profits would be in any equilibrium of the emission permits regime. Only if Q = 0, then his profits in the unique equilibrium of the emission taxes regime and the unique (and binding permits level) equilibrium of the permits regime are the same.
Summarizing our final results about the monopolistic scenario, taxes are the regulator's welfaremaximizing regime choice whenever Q = 0; in addition, maximizing welfare in the emission taxes regime implies higher profits for the gas supplier than maximizing welfare in the emission permits regime. And even if the difference between coal-based and gas-based per-unit-of-electricity emissions is such that Q = 0, taxes guarantee for the same welfare and result in the same profits for the gas supplier as permits.
A Remarks
In order to see that, as suggested in Section 2, the price equilibrium in the market for permits reduces to a quantity constraint and that a positive equilibrium permits price corresponds to a binding quantity constraint, suppose that, without loss of generality, there is only one electricity producer (instead of considering several identical producers), whose choice of factor inputs (K, G) ∈ R ++ maximizes Π(K, G) := ω ·F (K, G)−p K ·K −γ ·G−P ·e(K, G), taking as given the equilibrium price for electricity and for permits. Then, the electricity producer's corresponding profit-maximizing input combination (K(ω, P ), G(ω, P )) satisfies
. Market clearing in the market for electric-
. Defining
(for the latter equalities, cf. Lemma 1a in Appendix B), market clearing in the market for permits requires e(K * (P ), G * (P )) = a, which implies P = P * :=
. Note that P * > 0 if and only if
and that the latter condition characterizes a binding permits level in Appendix B, Lemma 2.1 to 2.3. Defining ω * := ω * (P * ), we have that factor inputs equal
respectively, i.e., factor inputs equal those of Lemma 2.1b to 2.3b, where the electricity producer's choice of factor inputs (K, G) ∈ R ++ maximizes Π (permits) (K, G)
subject to e(K, G) ≤ a and the permits level is assumed to be binding.
B Lemmata and Proofs
Lemma 1 (Equilibria in the Emission Taxes Regime) In any equilibrium of the emission taxes regime, a) factor inputs K and G equal
respectively, whenever (p, γ) satisfies β 0 γf K − pR(γ) > 0 and β 0 p K f G − pQ > 0. b) In the monopolistic scenario, gas price γ equals
(and is, in particular, independent of the regulator's tax level choice p) whenever p <
It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing tax level choice is p * def = q, i.e., equals the marginal welfare costs of emissions, independent of the scenario. Refining our representation of W γ (p), we obtain that
where the first quadratic function of p reflects the utility from electricity consumption and the second quadratic function of p reflects the sum of factor and emission costs. d) Welfare in the monopolistic and competitive scenario equals
respectively, whereW
equals the resulting welfare in case of no regulation (p = 0), respectively. In the monopolistic scenario, the gas supplier's profits are
is the unique equilibrium in the competitive scenario, and
is the unique equilibrium in the monopolistic scenario of the emission taxes regime.
Proof of Lemma 1 a) The electricity producer's profit maximization results in (
(and
). And,
b) The gas supplier's profits are well-defined and given by
whenever β 0 p K f G − pQ > 0 and both p <
. Considering the first derivative with respect to gas price γ, and, in particular, noting that [(
is equivalent to γ = γ * , the profit curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * , it is increasing on γ < γ * and decreasing on γ > γ * . If β 0 p K f G − pQ > 0 and both p <
then the gas supplier's profits cannot be maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
c) The calculation of W γ (p) is standard (cf. Appendix C). Noting that ∂Wγ (p) ∂p = 0 is equivalent to the tax level being equal to
obtains its maximum at q. In the competitive scenario, since q <q and (consequently) β 0 p K f G − qQ > 0, tax level q maximizes W ψ (p) over all p with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all p with β 0 p K f G −pQ > 0 and p < β 0 f K ψ R ). In the monopolistic scenario, since gas price γ * is independent of the regulator's tax level choice p, and since q <q
over all p with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all p with
All welfare levels follow immediately from the representation of W γ (p), noting that Φ(γ * ) = 2Φ and Ψ(γ * ) = Ψ +
Lemma 2.1 (Necessary Conditions for Equilibria in the Emission Permits Regime if Q < 0)
Assuming that any indifference of the gas supplier is resolved according to a preference for a binding (in comparison to a non-binding) emission permits level and that this is common knowledge, in any equilibrium of the emission permits regime in case of Q < 0, a) factor inputs K and G equal
respectively, if the emission permits level is non-binding, and b) factor inputs K and G equal
respectively, if the emission permits level is binding and (γ, a) satisfies
then the permits level is binding and gas price γ equals
If a > a 3 , then gas price γ equals
the gas supplier's profits are
and the permits level is non-binding. d) In the competitive scenario, where gas price γ equals ψ, (it is obvious that) permits level a is non-binding if a ≥ a 1 := 2δ K
e) If the emission permits level is non-binding, then (it is obvious that) the welfare levels equal those of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0, i.e., W C A (q) = W C p=0 (q) and W M A (q) = W M p=0 (q) in the competitive and monopolistic scenario, respectively (cf. Lemma 1). In particular, they are below their respective counterparts in the taxes regime (where p = p * = q > 0). f ) If the emission permits level is binding, then welfare, whenever 2β 0 δ G D + aR(γ) > 0 and
), can be calculated as
2 . It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, is
in the competitive and
in the monopolistic scenario. In particular, the regulator's permits level choice is higher in the monopolistic as compared to the competitive scenario. And, a *
If the regulator goes for the binding permits level alternative, then welfare in the competitive scenario (γ = ψ, a = a * C ) equals
In the monopolistic scenario (γ = γ * B , a =â * M ), if q ≥ q 3 (and thusâ * M = a * M ), welfare equals
If q < q 3 (and thusâ * M = a 3 < a * M ), welfare is no higher than W M B (q), and the gas supplier's profits are
g) In the competitive scenario, W C B (q) > W C A (q). Therefore, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * C , and the emission permits level is binding. h) In the monopolistic scenario, W M A (q)
. Therefore, if q >q(Q), then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice isâ * M = a * M , the emission permits level is binding, and the welfare level equals W M B (q). If q <q(Q), any permits level above a 3 maximizes welfare and, in particular, is non-binding, and the welfare level equals W M A (q). If q =q(Q), then welfare is maximized by choosing either a * M = a * M (resulting in a binding permits level) or any level above a 3 (resulting in a nonbinding permits level), and the welfare level equals W M B (q) = W M A (q).
Proof of Lemma 2.1 a) The electricity producer's profit maximization results in (K
The electricity producer's profit maximization results in (K(ω), G(ω)) ∈ arg max (K,G)∈R 2 ++ Π (permits) (K, G) subject to e(K, G) ≤ a. In particular, there exists a multiplier λ ∈ R ++ such that
, and
(and E(ω * B ) =
). It follows that K(ω * B ) = K * B and G(ω * B ) = G * B . c) First, note that the gas supplier's profits in case of a binding permits level are given by
Considering the first derivative with respect to gas price γ, and, in particular, noting that
, the profit curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * B , it is increasing on γ < γ * B and decreasing on γ > γ * B . For γ = γ * B , the profit curve (considered as a function of a) equals C B ( · ),
, noting that Ψ(γ * B ) = 2Ψ and Φ(γ * B ) = Φ +
Curve C B ( · ) is a quadratic function of a, it obtains its minimum value 0 at a 6
, it is decreasing on a < a 6 and increasing on a > a 6 . The gas supplier's profits in case of a non-binding permits level are given by
This curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * A , it is increasing on γ < γ * A and decreasing on γ > γ * A (cf. the proof of Lemma 1b). For γ = γ * A , this curve (considered as a function of a) is constant in a and equalsC A :=
If going for the binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing γ(a)
e., subject to the permits level being binding (cf. part a) of Lemma 2.1). First, note that going for the binding permits level alternative requires a < a 5 :=
, since otherwise the inequality constraint cannot be satisfied for γ ≥ 0: If a > a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to γ <γ(a),γ
, the fraction on the right-hand side being lower than zero (since the numerator is positive and the denominator negative), and if a = a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to −Q < 0, contradicting Q < 0. Note that, in particular, since a 5 < a 6 (cf. Appendix C), a < a 5 implies that a < a 6 , which is equivalent to 2β 0 δ K (−D) + aQ > 0. If a < a 5 , then the inequality constraint 2δ K
Appendix C), and if a > a −1
(< a 0 , cf. Appendix C), then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) is maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
, γ ≥ ψ) by choosing γ(a) = γ * B , and his corresponding profit is C B (a); if a ∈ [a 4 , a 5 ), then obviously the gas supplier's achievable profit cannot be higher than C B (a). If a ≤ a −1 , then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) cannot be maximized over all alternatives with a welldefined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
. If going for the non-binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing γ(a) ∈ arg max γ∈[ψ,∞) (γ−ψ)·G * A (γ) subject to 2δ K K * A +2δ G G * A ≤ a, i.e., subject to the permits level being non-binding. First, note that the inequality constraint is satisfied for all γ ≥ 0 if a ≥ a 5 . If a < a 5 , then the constraint cannot be satisfied for γ > 0 if a ≤ a 0
, and the constraint is equivalent to γ ≤γ(a) (> 0) if a > a 0 . In the latter case, i.e., a ∈ (a 0 , a 5 ), the interval of available gas prices is bounded from above by an increasing function of permits level a (cf. Appendix C), that allows the gas supplier to choose (gas price ψ exactly on a ≥ a 1
, and) gas price γ * A exactly on a ≥ a 2 := 2δ
Since 0 < a −1 < a 0 < a 1 < a 2 < a 4 < a 5 < a 6 (cf. Appendix C), it follows that the gas supplier's profit (if going for the non-binding alternative) is maximized by choosing γ(a) =γ(a) on a ∈ (a 0 , a 2 ] and γ(a) = γ * A on a ≥ a 2 , and his corresponding profit is lower thanC A on a ∈ (a 0 , a 2 ) and equalsC A on a ≥ a 2 .
Curve C B ( · ) equalsC A at both a 3 and a 7 := a 6 +
Appendix C). Since a 3 ∈ (a 2 , a 4 ) (cf. Appendix C),C A lies above C B ( · ) between a 3 and a 7 , andC A lies below C B ( · ) outside [a 3 , a 7 ]. In particular, given our assumption concerning the gas supplier's preference for a binding permits level (if indifferent with respect to profits), the gas supplier goes for the binding alternative if a ∈ (a −1 , a 3 ] and for the non-binding alternative if a > a 3 . d) It is easy to verify that
f ) The calculation of W γ (a) is standard (cf. Appendix C). Considering the first derivative with respect to permits level a, and, in particular, noting that ∂Wγ (a) ∂a = 0 is equivalent to the permits level being equal to
W γ (a) obtains its maximum at a * (γ), it is increasing on a < a * (γ) and decreasing on a > a * (γ). It is easy to verify that a
= q 3 , and that q 3 > 0 (cf. Appendix C). Since a * (γ * B ) and a 3 are both greater than
, and a * (ψ) < a 1 , and given our previous results for the two scenarios, we have that the welfare-maximizing permits level equals min{a * (γ * B ) = a * M , a 3 } in the monopolistic and a * (ψ) = a * C in the competitive scenario. To see that a * C (q) <â * M (q), note that a * (γ * B ) ≤ a 3 implies a * (ψ) < a * (γ * B ) = min{a * (γ * B ), a 3 }, and that a * (γ * B ) ≥ a 3 implies a * (ψ) < a 1 < a 3 = min{a * (γ * B ), a 3 }. All welfare implications follow immediately from the representation of W γ (a). The calculations for the gas supplier's profits are standard (cf. Appendix C). g) The relation between W C B (q) and W C A (q) is easy to verify (cf. Appendix C). h) The relation between q 3 andq(Q) and the relationship between W M B (q) and W M A (q) on the one hand and q andq(Q) on the other hand are both easy to verify (cf. Appendix C). 2
Lemma 2.2 (Necessary Conditions for Equilibria in the Emission Permits Regime if Q > 0)
In any equilibrium of the emission permits regime in case of Q > 0, a) factor inputs K and G equal K * A and G * A as specified in Lemma 2.1a, respectively, if the emission permits level is non-binding, and b) factor inputs K and G equal K * B and G * B as specified in Lemma 2.1b, respectively, if the emission permits level is binding and (γ, a) 
, then the permits level is binding and gas price γ equals γ *
If a ≥ a 2 , then the permits level is non-binding, gas price γ equals γ *
+ ψ, and the gas supplier's profits are Γ A as specified in Lemma 2.1c. If a ∈ a 4 , a 2
, then the permits level is non-binding, gas price γ equalsγ
, and the gas supplier's profits arê
In the competitive scenario, where gas price γ equals ψ, (it is obvious that) permits level a is non-binding if a ≥ a 1
, a 1 . e) In the competitive scenario, if the emission permits level is non-binding, then (it is obvious that) the welfare level equals that of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0, i.e., W C A (q) = W C p=0 (q) (cf. Lemma 1). In particular, the welfare level is below its counterpart in the emission taxes regime (where p = p * = q). In the monopolistic scenario, if the emission permits level is non-binding and a ≥ a 2 , then the welfare level equals that of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0, i.e., W M A (q) = W M p=0 (q) (cf. Lemma 1). In particular, the welfare level is below its counterpart in the taxes regime (where p = p * = q). If the emission permits level is non-binding and a ∈ [a 4 , a 2 ], then welfare can be calculated asŴ
It follows that the regulator's welfare maximizing permits level choice in the monopolistic scenario, if going for the non-binding permits level alternative, is a 4 if q >
, then any a ≥ a 2 or any a ≥ a 4 , respectively, maximizes welfare, resulting in welfare W M A (q). f ) If the emission permits level is binding, then welfare, whenever 2β 0 δ G D + aR(γ) > 0, equals W γ (a) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, is
in the competitive and in the monopolistic scenario, respectively. In particular, the regulator's permits level choice is lower in the monopolistic as compared to the competitive scenario. If the regulator goes for the binding permits level alternative, then welfare in the competitive scenario (γ = ψ, a = a * C ) equals W C B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. In the monopolistic scenario (γ = γ * B , a = a * M ), welfare equals W M B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f, and the gas supplier's profits are Γ B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. g) In the competitive scenario, W C B (q) > W C A (q). Therefore, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * C , and the emission permits level is binding.
. Therefore, if q >q(Q), then the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , the emission permits level is binding, and the welfare level equals W M B (q). If q <q(Q), any permits level a ≥ a 2 maximizes welfare and, in particular, is non-binding, and the welfare level equals W M A (q). If q =q(Q), then welfare is maximized by choosing either a * M (resulting in a binding permits level) or any level a ≥ a 2 (resulting in a non-binding permits level), and the welfare level equals
Proof of Lemma 2.2 c) First, note that the gas supplier's profits in case of a binding permits level are given by (γ − ψ) · G * B (γ) as specified in the proof of Lemma 2.1c. This curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * B and, for γ = γ * B , this curve (considered as a function of
. Curve C B ( · ) is a quadratic function of a, it is increasing and positive on a ≥ 0. The gas supplier's profits in case of a non-binding permits level are given by (γ − ψ) · G * A (γ) as specified in the proof of Lemma 2.1c. This curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * A and, for γ = γ * A , this curve (considered as a function of a) is constant in a and equalsC
(Cf. the proof of Lemma 2.1c.) Note that, since Q > 0, now 0 < a 5 < a 4 < a 2 < a 1 < a 0 and a −1 < a 4 (cf. Appendix C). If going for the non-binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing γ(a)
e., subject to the permits level being non-binding (cf. part a) of Lemma 2.2). First, note that going for the non-binding permits level alternative requires a > a 5
, since otherwise the inequality constraint cannot be satisfied for γ ≥ 0: If a < a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to γ ≤γ(a)
, the fraction on the right-hand side being lower than zero (since the numerator is negative and the denominator positive), and if a = a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to Q ≤ 0, contradicting Q > 0. If a > a 5 , then the inequality constraint 2δ K
, then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the nonbinding alternative) is maximized by choosing γ(a) = γ * A , and his corresponding profit is C A . If a ∈ (a 5 , a 2 ), then the gas supplier's profit is maximized by choosing γ(a) =γ(a), and his corresponding profit is (γ (a) 
Note that the latter curve is a concave quadratic function of a, which obtains its maximumC A at a 2 and equals C B (a 4 ) at a 4
If going for the binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing γ(a) ∈ arg max γ∈[ψ,∞) (γ−ψ)·G * B (γ) subject to 2δ K K * A +2δ G G * A > a, i.e., subject to the permits level being binding. First, note that the inequality constraint is satisfied for all γ ≥ 0 if a ≤ a 5 . If a > a 5 , then the constraint cannot be satisfied for
, and the constraint is equivalent to γ <γ(a) (> 0) if a < a 0 . In the latter case, i.e., a ∈ (a 5 , a 0 ), the interval of available gas prices is bounded from above by a decreasing function of permits level a (cf. Appendix C), that allows the gas supplier to choose (gas price ψ exactly on a < a 1
, and) gas price γ * B exactly on a < a 4 . If a ∈ (a −1 , a 4 ), then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) is maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
and his corresponding profit is
, which equalsΓ A (a) (cf. Appendix C). If a ≤ a −1 , then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) cannot be maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
SinceΓ A (a) is below C B (a) on a < a 4 and belowC A on a > a 2 , it follows that the gas supplier goes for the binding permits level alternative if a ∈ (a −1 , a 4 ) and for the nonbinding alternative if a ≥ a 4 . e) The calculation ofŴ M (a) is standard (cf Appendix C).
f ) The calculation of W γ (a) is standard (cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1f). W γ (a) obtains its maximum at a * (γ) as defined in the proof of Lemma 2.1f, and it is easy to verify that
> 0, and a * (ψ) > a * (γ * B ) (cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1f and note that q <q implies β 0 f G p K − qQ > 0). Given our previous results for the two scenarios, since a * (γ * B ) < a 4 and a * (ψ) < a 1 , the welfare-maximizing permits level is a * (γ * B ) = a * M in the monopolistic and a * (ψ) = a * C in the competitive scenario. All welfare implications follow immediately from the representation of W γ (a). The calculations for the gas supplier's profits are standard (cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1f). g) The relation W C B (q) > W C A (q) is easy to verify (cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1g). h) To see thatŴ M A (q) < W M B (q), note that, for a = a 4 and γ =γ(a 4 ) = γ * B , we have that
, whereŴ M (a) and W γ (a) are as defined in part e) and f), respectively. Since a * M (q) = arg max a W γ * B (a) and
B (q) and W M A (q) on the one hand and q andq(Q) on the other hand is easy to verify (cf. Appendix C).
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Lemma 2.3 (Necessary Conditions for Equilibria in the Emission Permits Regime if Q = 0)
In any equilibrium of the emission permits regime in case of Q = 0, a) factor inputs K and G equal K * A and G * A as specified in Lemma 2.1a, respectively, if the emission permits level is non-binding, and b) factor inputs K and G equal K * B and G * B as specified in Lemma 2.1b, respectively, if the emission permits level is binding and (γ, a) satisfies
, then the permits level is non-binding and gas price γ equals γ *
R(γ * B ) , a 0 ), then the permits level is binding and gas price γ equals γ *
In either case, the gas supplier's profits are Γ A as specified in Lemma 2.1c. d) In the competitive scenario, where gas price γ equals ψ, (it is obvious that) permits level a is non-binding if a ≥ a 1
, a 1 . e) If the emission permits level is non-binding, then (it is obvious that) the welfare levels equal those of the taxes regime for tax level p = 0, i.e., W C A (q) = W C p=0 (q) and W M A (q) = W M p=0 (q) in the competitive and monopolistic scenario, respectively (cf. Lemma 1). In particular, they are below their respective counterparts in the taxes regime (where p = p * = q). f ) If the emission permits level is binding, then welfare, whenever 2β 0 δ G D + aR(γ) > 0, equals W γ (a) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. It follows that the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice, if going for the binding permits level alternative, is
in the competitive and monopolistic scenario, respectively.
In particular, the regulator's permits level choice is the same in the two scenarios. If the regulator goes for the binding permits level alternative, then welfare in the competitive scenario (γ = ψ, a = a * C ) equals W C B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. In the monopolistic scenario (γ = γ * B , a = a * M ), welfare equals W M B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f, and the gas supplier's profits equal Γ A = Γ B (q) as specified in Lemma 2.1f. g) In the competitive scenario, W C B (q) > W C A (q). Therefore, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * C , the emission permits level is binding, and welfare equals W C B (q). h) In the monopolistic scenario, W M B (q) > W M A (q). Thus, the regulator's welfare-maximizing permits level choice is a * M , the emission permits level is binding, and welfare equals W M B (q).
Proof of Lemma 2.3 c) First, note that the gas supplier's profits in case of a binding permits level are given by (γ − ψ) · G * B (γ) as specified in the proof of Lemma 2.1c. This curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * B and, for γ = γ * B , this curve (considered as a function of a) is constant in a and equalsC B :=
The gas supplier's profits in case of a non-binding permits level are given by (γ − ψ) · G * A (γ) as specified in the proof of Lemma 2.1c. This curve (considered as a function of γ) obtains its maximum at γ * A and, for γ = γ * A , this curve (considered as a function of a) is constant in a and equalsC
=C B (for the latter equality, cf. Appendix C). (Cf. the proof of Lemma 2.1c.) Since Q = 0, now a −1 < a 0 = a 1 = a 2 = a 4 = a 5 (cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1c). If going for the binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing γ(a)
3). First, note that going for the binding permits level alternative requires a < a 5
, since otherwise the inequality constraint cannot be satisfied for γ ≥ 0: If a > a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to γ <γ(a)
, the fraction on the right-hand side being lower than zero (since the numerator is positive and the denominator negative), and if a = a 5 , then the inequality constraint is equivalent to Q > 0, contradicting Q = 0. If a < a 5 , then the inequality constraint 2δ K
, and if a > a −1 (< a 5 ), then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) is maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
, γ ≥ ψ) by choosing γ(a) = γ * B , and his corresponding profit isC B . If a ≤ a −1 , then the gas supplier's profit (if going for the binding alternative) cannot be maximized over all alternatives with a well-defined outcome (i.e., over all γ >
If going for the non-binding permits level alternative, profit is maximized by choosing
The inequality constraint is satisfied for all γ ≥ 0 if a ≥ a 5 , and the constraint cannot be satisfied for γ > 0 if a < a 5 . Thus, the gas supplier's profit (if going for the non-binding alternative) is maximized by choosing γ(a) = γ * A on a ≥ a 5 , and his corresponding profit isC A . It follows that the gas supplier goes for the binding alternative if a ∈ (a −1 , a 5 ) and for the non-binding alternative if a ≥ a 5 .
(cf. our calculations for Lemma 2.1f). Since a * (γ * B ) < a 0 (= a 4 ) and a * (ψ) < a 1 , and given our previous results for the two scenarios, the welfare-maximizing permits level equals a * (γ * B ) = a * M in the monopolistic and a * (ψ) = a * C in the competitive scenario. All welfare implications follow immediately from the representation of W γ (a). Finally, it is easy to verify that Γ B (q) = Γ A (cf. our notes at the beginning of Appendix C). 
is the unique equilibrium (and one with a binding permits level) in the competitive scenario of the emission permits regime. In the monopolistic scenario, if q <q(Q) (which implies Q = 0), then there does not exist an equilibrium with a binding permits level.
is the unique equilibrium with a binding permits level; if q >q(Q), it is the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 3 and 4 follow from standard calculations (cf. Appendix C).
Lemma 3 (Differences in Welfare and in the Gas Supplier's Profits across Regimes) a) In the monopolistic scenario, if q >q(Q), then the difference in welfare between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime, (K * (γ * , p * ), G * (γ * , p * ), γ * , p * ), and the unique equilibrium of the permits regime,
In particular, if Q = 0, then this difference is greater than zero, it is increasing in marginal emission cost q if Q < 0, and it is decreasing in q if Q > 0 (note that β 0 p K f G − qQ > 0, which, if Q > 0, follows from q <q).
If q ≤q(Q) (which implies Q = 0), then the difference in welfare between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime and any equilibrium of the permits regime is
p=0 (q) > 0 and increases in marginal emission cost q (cf. Lemma 1). b) If q ≥q(Q) (> q 3 if Q < 0), then the difference in the resulting gas supplier's profits between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime, (K * (γ * , p * ), G * (γ * , p * ), γ * , p * ), and the binding permits level equilibrium,
In particular, if Q = 0, then this difference is greater than zero; whereas the gas price is higher in the emission permits regime, the demand for gas is lower: γ * < γ * B and G * > G * B . If q ≤q(Q) (which implies Q = 0), then the difference in the resulting gas supplier's profits between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime and any non-binding permits level equilibrium of the permits regime is
Here, the gas price is the same in the two regimes (γ * = γ * A ), and the demand for gas is lower in the permits regime if Q < 0 (i.e., G * > G * A ) and higher if Q > 0 (i.e., G * < G * A ). c) In the competitive scenario, the difference in welfare between the unique equilibrium of the taxes regime, (K * (p * ), G * (p * ), p * ), and the unique equilibrium of the permits regime,
Lemma 4
For ψ sufficiently high (in relative terms),q(Q) (and thus also q 3 <q(Q) in case of Q < 0) is (well) below the boundaryq for marginal emission cost q, i.e.,q(Q) <
C Calculations
Note that, in some of the subsequent calculations, we use that
C.1 Calculations for Lemma 1c
Wγ(p) = β0 β1 [2fK √ K * + 2fG √ G * ] − 1 2β1 [2fK √ K * + 2fG √ G * ] 2 − [pK K * + γG * ] − q[2δK √ K * + 2δG √ G * ] = β0 β1 · [2β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β1p(fK δK γ + fGδGpK )] Φ(γ) − 1 2β1 · [2β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β1p(fK δK γ + fGδGpK )] 2 Φ(γ) 2 − pK · [β0γfK − p R(γ)] 2 Φ(γ) 2 − γ · [β0pK fG − p Q] 2 Φ(γ) 2 − 2qδK · [β0γfK − p R(γ)] Φ(γ) − 2qδG · [β0pK fG − p Q] Φ(γ) , i.e. 2β1Φ(γ) 2 · Wγ(p) = 2β0[2β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β1p(fK δK γ + fGδGpK )][β1pK γ + 2f 2 K γ + 2f 2 G pK ] − [2β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β1p(fK δK γ + fGδGpK )] 2 − 2β1pK [β0γfK + (2fGfK δG − δK β1γ − 2δK f 2 G )p] 2 − 2β1γ[β0pK fG + (2fGfK δK − δGβ1pK − 2δGf 2 K )p] 2 − 4β1qδK [β0γfK + 2fGfK δGp − δK pβ1γ − 2δK pf 2 G ]Φ(γ) − 4β1qδG[β0pK fG + 2fK fGδK p − δGpβ1pK − 2δGpf 2 K ]Φ(γ) =W 2 (γ) · p 2 +W 1 (γ) · p +W 0 (γ) , wherẽ W 2 (γ) = − (2β1) 2 (fK δK γ + fGδGpK ) 2 − 2β1pK (2fGfK δG − δK β1γ − δK 2f 2 G ) 2 − 2β1γ(2fGfK δK − δGβ1pK − δG2f 2 K ) 2 = − 2β1 · Ψ(γ) · Φ(γ) , W 1 (γ) = − 4β0β1(fK δK γ + fGδGpK )(β1pK γ + 2f 2 K γ + 2f 2 G pK ) + 4β0β1(2f 2 K γ + 2f 2 G pK )(fK δK γ + fGδGpK ) − 4β0β1pK fK γ(2fGfK δG − δK β1γ − δK 2f 2 G ) − 4β0β1pK fGγ(2fGfK δK − δGβ1pK − δG2f 2 K ) − 4β1q(2fGfK δGδK − δ 2 K β1γ − δ 2 K 2f 2 G )Φ(γ) − 4β1q(2fGfK δK δG − δ 2 G β1pK − δ 2 G 2f 2 K )Φ(γ) = 4β1qΦ(γ)[δ 2 K (β1γ + 2f 2 G ) + δ 2 G (β1pK + 2f 2 K ) − 4fGfK δGδK ] = 4β1q · Φ(γ) · Ψ(γ) , and W 0 (γ) = (2β0) 2 (f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK )(β1pK γ + 2f 2 K γ + 2f 2 G pK ) − (2β0) 2 (f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) 2 − 2β1pK (β0γfK ) 2 − 2β1γ(β0pK fG) 2 − 4β1qδK β0γfK Φ(γ) − 4β1qδGβ0pK fGΦ(γ) = 2β0[β1pK γ + 2f 2 K γ + 2f 2 G pK ]β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β0Φ(γ)2β1q(fK δK γ + δGfGpK ) = 2β0 · Φ(γ) · [β0(f 2 K γ + f 2 G pK ) − 2β1q(fK δK γ + δGfGpK )].
C.2 Calculations for Lemma 2.1c
To see that 0 < a−1 < a0 < a1 < a2 < a4 < a5 < a6, note that the first inequality is obvious, that a0 > a−1 is equivalent to
that a4 > a2 is equivalent to 2β0(fK δK ψ + fGδGpK ) + 2
that a4 < a5 is equivalent to 2β0(fK δK ψ + fGδGpK ) + 2
and that a5 < a6 is equivalent to 2β0δK fK β1pK + 2f
a true statement. To see that a3 ∈ (a2, a4), note that a3 > a2 is equivalent to
a true statement, and that, in Lemma 2.1f, we show that a3 = a4 − 4Ψ · Φ +
The intersections of CB(a) withCA are determined by
C.3 Calculations for Lemma 2.1d
Note that
C.4 Calculations for Lemma 2.1f
Note that a * (ψ) < a * (γ * B ) is equivalent to β0(fK δK ψ + fGδGpK ) Φ + (β1pK + 2f
To see that a
, note that 2β0δGD + a * (ψ)R > 0 is equivalent to (the true statement)
Furthermore, note that a * (γ * B ) = a3 is equivalent to β0(fK δK ψ + fGδGpK ) + Thus, 2β0δGD + R(γ * B )a * (γ * B ) > 0 is equivalent to
, which is satisfied since q <q
In order to see that a3 >
, note that a3 > a1 > 
C.5 Calculations for Lemma 2.1g
Note that W C A (q) < W C B (q) is equivalent to (the true statement) −2β0β1q(fK δK ψ + fGδGpK ) + β 2 0 (f
C.6 Calculations for Lemma 2.1h 
